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The result of relatively recent financial innovations, collateralised debt obligations (CDOs) are securities
that represent a portfolio of bank loans and/or different financial instruments. Part securitisation instrument
part credit derivative, these increasingly-popular structured finance products are used by financial institutions
for various purposes, ranging from reducing their cost of financing to exploiting arbitrage opportunities or
transferring credit risk. Irrespective of their form, CDOs are issued in different tranches that are tailored
using securitisation techniques. The process of tranching allows credit risk and returns on their underlying
portfolio to be redistributed to investors in an ad hoc fashion.
CDOs are part of an ongoing trend of converting credit risk into a marketable commodity. This process
started with securitisation, and was then sustained by the development of credit ratings and corporate
bond markets and, more recently, by that of credit derivatives. While CDO issuance represents at most the
equivalent of a sixth of that of corporate bonds, the influence of these products has a far greater significance
because of the amount of credit risk they allow to be transferred. The sharp growth in synthetic structures
backed by credit derivatives, especially in Europe, has heightened this trend.
The rapid development of CDOs has improved non-bank investors’ access to credit markets and has
enabled them to overcome the obstacles posed by the size and limited diversification of the corporate
bond market, notably in Europe where bank intermediation remains predominant. Investors can now choose
portfolios with specific risk-return profiles and take exposures to credit risk previously confined to banks’
balance sheets, such as SME loans.
Given that CDOs are credit risk transfer instruments, they facilitate the redistribution of this risk within the
financial and banking sector and even beyond, while increasing the degree of completeness of the credit
market. They should therefore have a positive impact on financial stability. However, as is often the case
with financial innovations, evaluating CDOs and the risks they entail, particularly in the case of Synthetic
CDOs, requires the use of complex techniques that are not always sufficiently tried and tested. Both
investors and market participants may thus be exposed to relatively high potential losses. At present, this
risk does not appear to be of a systemic nature given the size and relative newness of the market.
Nonetheless, if this market continues to grow at its current pace, attracting increasing numbers of investors,
in particular in Europe where CDOs are predominantly synthetic, systemic risk may emerge.
Moreover, growth in CDO issuance seems to have contributed to the marked narrowing of spreads over
the past two years on all credit markets. This trend raises questions as to the links between the CDO
market and the corporate bond and credit derivatives markets, and deserves particular attention with
regard to the risk of the propagation and amplification of strains that may arise on the CDO market due to
its still limited liquidity and transparency.44 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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1| THE MAIN CHARACTERISTICS
OF CDOS
1|1 Mechanisms
Collateralised Debt obligations (CDOs) are securities
that represent a portfolio of different financial
instruments or assets. They constitute a class of
credit risk transfer instrument in their own right and
generally combine the three mechanisms common
to all securitisation structures:
• the construction, by a financial institution, of a
reference portfolio comprising a pool of bank loans
and/or negotiable financial instruments (bonds,
other debt securities, etc.), and/or credit derivatives.
However, unlike traditional securitisation
transactions that are backed by portfolios of
homogenous assets comprising exposures to a large
number of obligors (ABS, RMBS, CMBS, etc.), CDOs
are usually backed by heterogeneous exposures to a
limited number of names;
• the de-linking of the portfolio’s credit risk with that
of the originator of the portfolio via the use of a
Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), or fonds commun de
créances in France1, that issues the CDO and holds
the underlying assets;
• the tranching of CDOs backed by this portfolio.
Each tranche has a specific seniority rank in terms
of the rights to the cash flows generated by the
underlying assets or credit derivatives. The senior,
mezzanine, and equity tranches have decreasing
ranks in terms of these rights. The risk and return
offered by these tranches increase symmetrically.
Whereas the senior and mezzanine tranches
generally have an original maturity of close to five
years and offer bond-type returns, the equity tranche
does not have a predefined maturity and offers a
return linked to the performance of the underlying
portfolio, which has no ex ante upper or lower bound.
The splitting of CDO into different tranches dictates
a sequential allocation of the losses that may be
sustained by the underlying portfolio. The equity
tranche is the first to absorb losses in the event of
one or more defaults in the portfolio. If losses exceed
the value of this tranche, they are absorbed by the
mezzanine tranche. Lastly, if there are a large
number of significant defaults, the senior tranche
may be affected and sustain losses that have not been
absorbed by the other tranches. This sequence
means that the holders of each tranche (with the
exception of the equity tranche) are protected from
the risk of loss by one or more junior tranches.
However, the senior and mezzanine tranches may
also be protected by the use of specific mechanisms
such as the overcollateralising of assets, reserve
accounts or trapping excess spread. In all events,
these credit enhancement techniques should allow
the senior tranche to achieve a higher rating than
the average rating of the underlying portfolio.
1|2 Types of CDOs
CDOs are generally classified according to (see Box 1):
• the aim of the transaction: balance-sheet CDOs or
arbitrage CDOs;
• the way in which the credit risk of the underlying
portfolio is transferred: this transfer can be achieved
through the sale of the pool of assets to the issuing
entity, or synthetically, through credit derivatives
referencing names or assets included the underlying
portfolio;
• the composition of the underlying portfolio. CDOs are
generally backed by bank loans, corporate bonds or
emerging sovereign bonds and, in the case of
synthetic CDOs, credit derivatives. Over the past few
years, the range of underlying instruments has
broadened to other structured products (CDOs of
ABS, CDOs of CDOs).
Balance sheet CDOs enable the originator to
securitise assets such as bank loans or corporate
bonds recorded on its balance sheet. Assets and/or
credit risk can thereby be transferred to a separate
legal entity, allowing the orignator to manage its
balance sheet: remove assets, free up regulatory
capital2, manage portfolio credit risk, diversify and
reduce financing costs.
1 Since the reform of the legal regime of the fonds communs de créances in November 2004; see Nesi (2005).
2 See Joint Forum (2004), Appendix 3, for the supervisory treatment of CDO structures by credit institutions.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 45
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Box 1
Types of CDO
Criteria Type of credit risk transfer Types of CDO
Aim of transaction
Balance sheet management True sale/Credit derivatives Balance sheet CDO
Arbitrage True sale/Credit derivatives Arbitrage CDO
Securitisation method/technique
Cash True sale Cash-flow CDO
Synthetic Credit derivatives Synthetic CDO (CSO)
Underlying assets
Bank loans True sale/Credit derivatives CLO
Bonds True sale/Credit derivatives CBO
CDS Credit derivatives CSO; single-tranche CDO
Structured products True sale/Credit derivatives CDO of ABS, CDO of CDO (CDO2)
Hybrid portfolios True sale/Credit derivatives CDO
3 The arranger is an investment bank or an asset management firm responsible for placing tranches with investors in return for a fee. In the case
of arbitrage CDOs, it may also originate the transaction, or even actively manage the underlying portfolio.
Arbitrage CDOs allow the originator (in general the
arranger)3 to take advantage of the positive spread
between the average yield on the underlying
portfolio and the interest rate paid on the tranches
issued. Contrary to balance sheet CDOs, the
originator of the transaction may or may not hold
the underlying portfolio beforehand, and may
construct it by purchasing the assets on the market,
which means that the securities in question must
be fairly liquid.
Even if the spread between the yield on the
underlying portfolio and the tranches issued does
not offer an arbitrage opportunity per se it
nevertheless remains a key factor in the financial
viability of the transaction as it makes it possible to
generate, after covering the costs of setting up the
structure (and in particular the payment of
intermediation fees), an excess spread that can be
used to compensate the equity tranche holders and
if necessary to enhance the credit of the other
tranches. Naturally, the lower the interest rate paid
on the tranches, the larger the excess spread, which
requires that the tranches be rated in the investment
grade universe, in particular via the use of different
ad hoc credit enhancement mechanisms.
In practice, however, the difference between balance
sheet CDOs and arbitrage CDOs is not clear-cut.
In the case of balance sheet CDOs, the originator of
the assets may also attempt to take advantage of the
excess spread by holding the equity tranche, which
enables it to continue to capture a large part of the
return on the assets transferred while improving its
cost of financing.
In the case of both balance sheet CDOs and arbitrage
CDOs, the credit risk on the portfolio may be
transferred in two alternative or complementary
ways: either via the true sale of assets and/or
synthetically, by buying protection via credit default
swaps with the vehicle issuing the CDO. In the case
of cash-flow CDOs, which use traditional
securitisation mechanisms (see diagram overleaf),
credit risk is transferred via a true sale of assets.46 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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Principal + interest
Obligors










EUR 88 millions 
Yield Euribor + 50 basis points
Mezzanine tranche BBB
EUR 5 millions
Yield Euribor + 300 basis points
Equity tranche unrated






EUR 100 millions 
CDO tranche 
EUR 100 millions 
Stage 1  The originator transfers the bank
  loans/bonds to the SPV.
Stage 2  The SPV acquires the portfolio
  and in return issues CDO tranches.
Stage 3  The tranches
  are sold to investors.
Diagram of a cash-flow CDO
These structures serve both to raise funds and to
transfer credit risk, via the sale of the underlying
assets to the issuing entity. Furthermore, the servicer
collects the cash flows from the portfolio on behalf
of the SPV and this income is subsequently
reallocated to the holders of the tranches.
Synthetic CDOs (see Box 2) are mainly used to
transfer credit risk and/or for arbitrage purposes.
They have the advantage of avoiding the transfer of
ownership of the assets and are therefore not subject
to notification requirements vis-à-vis the obligors
(preserving relations with the client in question).
This also means that cash flows produced by the
underlying assets do not need to be managed.4
The credit risk on the reference portfolio is
transferred via credit default swaps through which
the SPV sells protection to the originator of the deal
in return for periodic fees. The risk is then
transferred to investors through the issuance of
funded synthetic CDOs, or through credit default
swaps (unfunded synthetic CDOs) or a combination
of the two (partially funded CDOs).
In the case of arbitrage CDOs, their synthetic nature
also reduces the costs of assembling the underlying
portfolio, as credit derivatives are often more liquid
than the bonds of the issuers concerned.
Lastly, the creation of the single-tranche CDO
constitutes a major innovation in synthetic CDO
4 Synthetic securitisation is now possible under French law since the reform, in November 2004, of the legal regime of the fonds communs de
créances, which makes it possible to use credit derivatives for buying or selling protection. See Nési (2005).
structures (See Box 3). In these vehicles, only one
tranche of the structure – in general at the
mezzanine level – is sold to the investor. These
“truncated” structures enable arrangers to meet
investors’ requirements, while reducing the time
needed to set up the deals and sell the tranches.
However, they involve very specific mechanisms,
notably in terms of hedging requirements for the
arrangers.
While they may be differentiated according to their
functions or risk transfer mechanism, CDOs may
also differ in terms of the types of underlying assets
used. When backed by bank loans, they are known
as collateralised loan obligations (CLOs) and when
backed by corporate bonds, they are referred to as
collateralised bond obligations (CBOs). Lastly,
synthetic CDOs backed by credit derivatives are
known as collateralised synthetic obligations (CSOs).
Moreover, the type of underlying assets may include
structured products. In such cases, the CDO involves
the securitisation of the structured products that are
themselves derived from already existing
securitisation structures (CDO of ABS). Such
products may result from the securitisation of
commercial or mortgage loans, consumer loans or
credit card receivables. Furthermore, tranches of
CDOs can themselves be securitised, which results
in a CDO of CDOs (or CDO2). Despite their
particularly complex nature, the latter have
developed rapidly over the past two years.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 47
ARTICLES
The CDO market: Functioning and implications in terms of financial stability
Box 2
Funding structures of synthetic CDOs
In synthetic securitisation structures, CDO tranches are issued in varying proportions. These structures may thus be
funded, partially funded or unfunded. The main considerations in the design of these funding structures are the cost and
management of counterparty risk. A fully funded structure incurs higher costs but is inherently less exposed to counterparty
risk.
In the case of fully funded structures, the CDO encompasses a series of securities whose issuance amount is equal to that
of the reference portfolio. Given that the underlying credit default swap between the originator of the transaction and the
SPV does not entail cash payments (except for premia), proceeds from the sale of tranches are reinvested in risk-free
assets (usually government bonds). Unless a credit event occurs on the underlying portfolio, the issuing entity can cover
costs of setting up the structure as well as the interest payments to the tranche holders by using the interest from the
collateral pool together with the premia from the CDS entered into by the SPV. In this way, investors “pre-fund” the structure,
bearing in mind that, should a credit event occur, the SPV can compensate the originator by selling part of the risk-free
assets. For the other tranche holders, this sale results in a loss in the form of a reduction in the repayment of the principal
of the tranches.
In the case of unfunded structures, the CDO is entirely backed by CDS (equivalent to a basket of CDS). The ability of the
SPV to compensate the originator if a credit event occurs therefore depends on the creditworthiness of the buyers of
CDOs.
Lastly, in the case of partially funded CDOs, which are the most common type, risk is transferred to investors partly via CDS
and partly through issuing securities (see diagram). These structures generally comprise a CDS whose notional amount is
large in relation to the tranches issued, known as a “super senior swap” as it benefits from the subordination of the senior
tranche and is therefore the part of the structure best protected against losses. The swap is nevertheless subject to
counterparty risk and is thus entered into with a highly-rated entity (in general an insurer specialised in offering credit risk
protection – known as a “monoline” insurer – or a prime bank). The main attraction of this type of structure for originating
banks is that it enables them to transfer significant amounts of credit risk, and hence to free up large amounts of regulatory
capital, at a much lower cost than that of funded CDOs thanks to the substantial reduction in the value of tranches to be
placed with investors. Moreover, the cost of buying protection via a super senior tranche is much lower (a premium of
10 basis points) than the interest rate paid on a AAA-rated senior tranche (Euribor +50 basis points, due to super-senior
counterparties’ preference (and in particular that of monoline insurers) for taking on credit risk without funding it.1
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Senior tranche AAA 
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Yield: Euribor + 50 basis points
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EUR 5 millions 
Yield: Euribor + 300 basis points
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Notional: EUR 87 millions







Stage 1 The originator transfers the credit risk 
of the portfolio (of which 13% to the 
SPV and 87% to the super-senior 
counterparty) and pays a premium 
to the SPV and the super-senrior 
counterparty in exchange of protection.
Stage 2 The SPV issues CDO tranches for an 
amount of EUR 13 millions (i.e. 13% 
of the reference portfolio
Stage 3 The SPV invests the proceeds from the 
sales of the tranches (EUR 13 millions) 
in risk free assets
 1 See Tavakoli (2003), Chapter 948 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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While in theory a very broad range of underlying
instruments may be employed, the structure of the
deal and the way in which risk is transferred largely
determine the type of assets used. Indeed, certain
underlying instruments (investment grade bonds, for
example) do not offer a high enough return, to say the
least in the current environment, to back cash-flow
CDOs. However, by using partially funded structures
(see Box 2), assets with lower returns can be used while
the vehicle’s cost of financing can be reduced.
Box 3
Single-tranche CDO, hedging and leverage
Single-tranche CDOs are a recent but far-reaching financial innovation in the CDO market. These CDOs were created in
2003 and are synthetic in nature. The arranger sells a single tranche – usually at the mezzanine level – to a single investor,
instead of selling all the tranches (equity, mezzanine and senior).
These CDOs, which may be funded or unfunded, have the following advantages:
• They are attractive to investors because the tranche is tailored to the requirements of the buyer, which can choose the
names in the underlying portfolio, the subordination level of the tranche and its size. This avoids some of the dangers of
traditional CDO structures, such as the risks of moral hazard or adverse selection in the choice of the names in the portfolio
or conflicting interests between the holders of the different tranches.
• They are attractive to the arrangers because single-tranche CDOs are relatively easy to set up. Unlike traditional CDOs,
they save the cost and the time of selling different classes of tranches. Moreover, selling costs are lower because in general
the investor contacts the arranger, and not vice versa.
Thanks to these advantages, single-tranche CDOs accounted for around 90% of the synthetic CDOs issued in 2003 and
2004, according to Standard and Poor’s. However, they are becoming increasingly sophisticated and may have a major
impact on credit spreads due to their leverage.
In a traditional CDO, the arranger does not take the risk: its role is mainly to sell tranches, or to originate the transaction in
the case of arbitrage CDOs. The risk is fully transferred to the investors via the SPV. In a single-tranche CDO, however, the
arranger becomes the direct counterparty of the investor because there is no vehicle in the structure. It is therefore the
seller of the CDO and the buyer of protection on the single tranche of the CDO it sells, which makes it vulnerable to
changes in credit spreads on the underlying portfolio of the CDO (market risk) and to defaults on this portfolio (default risk).
It must therefore hedge its position by selling protection on the CDS market or through transactions based on CDS indices.
The amount of protection sold is a multiple (the “delta”) of the notional value of the tranche and enables the arranger to
restore a neutral position. This delta is calculated using mathematical models and broadly represents the sensitivity of the
tranche’s value to changes in spreads on the names in the reference portfolio. Furthermore, the arranger has to frequently
adjust its position to take account of changes in spreads using dynamic delta hedging.
Single-tranche CDOs, like all subordinated CDO tranches, are often presented as leveraged products, as their delta is
higher than 1 (between 5 to 10 for the mezzanine tranche, according to its subordination level and its size). This leverage
can be ascribed to the fact that much of the credit risk of the reference portfolio is concentrated in the subordinated
tranches (mezzanine and equity), due to the sequential allocation of losses. For the mezzanine tranche, losses on underlying
portfolio to the tune of 6% to 10% (depending on the size of the tranche) would be sufficient for investors to lose their entire
stake. Naturally, investors are rewarded for taking more risk by receiving higher returns. However, in order to hedge this
risk, arrangers have to sell protection for a multiple of the notional value of the tranche sold, which contributes to the
narrowing of credit spreads on the CDS market.
.../...Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 49
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Hedging: sale of protection 
Delta neutral (delta = 5) 















Diagram of single-tranche CDO
2| MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
2|1 Measurement difficulties
The CDO market is particularly difficult to quantify
and map due to the lack of sources that are reliable,
consistent and representative of the market as whole.
The available data, which are mainly produced by
credit rating agencies and investment banks, show
issuance volumes and not outstandings.
Furthermore, they are often fragmented,
heterogeneous and difficult to reconcile. Indeed, a
sizeable part of the market is composed of unrated
private deals. The increasingly wide-spread use of
single-tranche CDOs has further strengthened this
trend. Moreover, while cash-flow CDOs do not raise
measurement difficulties, this is not the case for
synthetic CDOs, due to the different funding
structures of these products (see Box 2). For
cash-flow CDOs, it suffices to measure the value of
tranches issued, which more or less corresponds to
that of the underlying portfolio. For a synthetic CDO,
however, the value of the tranches issued may only
correspond to a fraction of the underlying portfolio
of derivatives.
Three competing measures can be used to assess
synthetic CDO issuance:
• the first relates to the “funded” part of the issue,
focusing on the value of the tranches issued. This
measure is widely used because the data are easy to
obtain and can be used to determine the relative size
of CDO issuance, in particular with respect to
corporate bond issuance. However, it underestimates
the size of the synthetic CDO market in relation to
that of the cash-flow CDO market as well as the
magnitude of credit risk transfers through these
products;
• the second measure centres on the value of the
underlying portfolio. It makes it possible to
determine the amount of credit risk transferred but
overweights issuance volumes of single-tranche
CDOs, for which only a fraction of the underlying
portfolio is subject to risk transfer;
• the third measure focuses on the supply of credit
protection stemming from hedging transactions
resulting from synthetic CDOs issuance (CDO bid
for credit). This relatively recent measurement
method is particularly suited to single-tranche CDOs.50 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
ARTICLES
The CDO market: Functioning and implications in terms of financial stability
It measures synthetic CDO issuance on the basis of
the delta neutral hedging requirements that they
impose on arrangers (see  Box  3). These
requirements vary according to the size of the
tranche issued, its subordination level and, hence,
its leverage. In this way, it makes it possible to gauge
the potential impact of CDO issuance on the credit
spreads of the issuers traded on the CDS market.
For example, for a reference portfolio with a value
of EUR 100 million, a mezzanine tranche of
EUR 3 million requires the arranger to hedge its
position by selling protection to the tune of five times
the amount (delta = 5) on the CDS market. These
protection sales therefore amount to EUR 15 million,
i.e. a level between the size of the tranche and that
of the underlying portfolio.
Measurement method and estimates of overall
volumes of CDO issuance in 2004
Source: Creditflux, JP Morgan – figures including CDO tranches based on CDS
indices.
Methodology: see JP Morgan (2005).
2|2 Main segments of the market
The CDO market originated in the United States,
and then rapidly developed in a number of forms in
Europe and Asia.5 However, it remains difficult to
determine the exact size of each market segment,
due to the varying weight of synthetic CDO issuance
in these areas and the differences in measurement
techniques used for this segment (see above).
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5 The geographical classification of CDOs is determined by their place of issue and sale. For example, the European CDO market refers to CDOs
issued in Europe for European investors, but may include US underlying assets.
6 Creditflux provides data and publishes a review of the credit derivatives and CDO market.
In 2004, the global cash-flow CDO market totalled
over USD 100 billion in terms of issuance volumes,
of which three-quarters in the United States, one-fifth
in Europe and the remaining 5% in Asia.
Cash-flow CDO issuance by geographical area
Source: JP Morgan
There are few estimates of the size of the synthetic
CDO market. The Creditflux database6 does provide
information on this segment, but it does not cover
the whole market. Using figures from this source
and estimates by JP Morgan, it is nevertheless
possible to estimate the size of the synthetic CDO
market as a whole using the different measurement
criteria available (see table). For funded structures
alone, issuance volumes appear to be almost double
those of cash-flow CDOs.
It is rare to find data breaking down the issuance of
synthetic CDOs by geographical area. It is however
possible to determine their volume in relation to that
of cash-flow CDOs in each area: 94% of European
CDOs rated by Standard and Poor’s in 2004 were
synthetic, compared with 31% in the United States.
Synthetic CDO issuance may therefore be considered
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2|3 Increasing product sophistication
Since CDOs first appeared at the end of the 1980s in
the United States, the range of structures and
underlying assets has not stopped growing in size
and complexity. However, the development of the
market only started to gain pace as of the late 1990s,
on the back of the boom in credit derivatives.
The growth of the credit derivatives market provided
a new form of collateral, which was conducive to
the expansion of the synthetic CDO market. Issuance
of synthetic CDOs rapidly gained ground, as the use
of credit derivatives gradually extended to several
hundred underlying names. This growth was
particularly marked in Europe, due to persistent legal
and tax obstacles, in a number of Member States, to
securitisation transactions involving the true sale of
the underlying assets, as well as to the relatively
limited interest in these transactions for refinancing
purposes in view of the size of European banks’
deposit base.
The boom in synthetic CDOs was also accompanied
by a surge in arbitrage CDO activity. Indeed, by using
a synthetic structure it is possible to generate a
substantial yield spread between the underlying
portfolio and the tranches issued, even though the
narrowing of spreads since the end of 2002 has
slightly reduced this source of “arbitrage”. Firstly, as
regards the yield on the underlying portfolio, CDS
premia are often wider than the corporate bond
spreads due to market imperfections.7 Secondly, the
use of partly funded structures (see Box 2) reduces
the CDO’s cost of financing. As of 2002, the
proportion of synthetic arbitrage CDOs in total
issuance rose markedly. This trend was fuelled by
banks declining interest in balance sheet CDOs due
to both developments in their supervisory treatment
(see prospect of Basel II)8 and to risk management
considerations; banks tend to show a preference for
managing the risk from their loans or corporate bond
portfolios through individual credit default swaps





CDOs of ABS 




7 See Blanco, Brennan et Marsh (2004)
8 On the impact of the provisions of the New Basel Capital Accord with regard to securitisation, and in particular on the incentives for banks to
transfer credit risk, see Joint Forum (2004).
Four generations of CDOs
The broadening of the range of underlying assets
was also largely associated with the rapid and
pronounced narrowing of credit spreads as of late
2002: as spreads narrowed, increasingly few assets
offered a sufficiently high yield to be worth
securitising in arbitrage transactions, forcing CDO
sellers to use more specific underlying instruments
that provided additional yield due to their complexity
or lack of liquidity. This gave rise to the securitisation
of existing senior and mezzanine tranches of
traditional structured finance products (CDOs of
ABS, of RMBS, of CMBS, etc.). In 2004, structured
finance CDO issuance stood at almost one-fifth of
that of cash-flow CDO issuance in Europe and over
half in the United States. Similarly, issuance of CDOs
of CDOs (CDO2) emerged, above all in synthetic
form. While, at the outset, these structures primarily
stemmed from the restructuring of existing
underperforming CDO portfolios, they then started
to attract investors because of the yields and leverage
they offered, despite their high correlation risk
(see below). Lastly, the recent growth in leveraged
buy-out transactions (LBOs) gave rise to the
securitisation of syndicated loans originated as part
of these transactions.52 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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Gradually, as investors became increasingly familiar
with the CDO market, they started to target either
tailored or standard products. The demand for
tailored products resulted in the creation of
single-tranche CDOs (see Box 3). Conversely, some
market participants showed increasing interest in
standard CDO tranches in order to maintain
sufficiently liquid buy/sell positions for their active
portfolio management strategies. To meet this
requirement, synthetic CDOs based on standard
tranches of indices representing CDS portfolios, such
as the DJ iTraxx index (see Box 4), were created.
Thanks to their standardisation and the transparency
offered by the indices, these tranches are also likely
to appeal to a wider array of investors seeking to
increase their positions on credit markets. This
polarisation between bespoke and standard tranches
recalls that between the OTC and regulated segments
of derivatives markets, while highlighting the
increasing maturity of the CDO market.
While the above trends are general, a number of
specific features have been observed on European
and American markets. For example, although
cash-flow CDOs remain slightly predominant in the
United States, synthetic CDOs represent the bulk of
the market in Europe (see above). The relative
abundance of high yield assets (ABS, MBS, etc.) in
the United States, which still makes it possible to
construct viable cash-flow CDOs despite the low
level of spreads, goes some way to explaining their
ongoing predominance. Conversely, in Europe,
where bank intermediation remains high, CLOs
backed by SME loans have developed further,
especially thanks to the fact that the tranches issued
sometimes enjoy ad hoc guarantee schemes, as is
the case, for example, in Spain.
2|4 An increasingly diverse
investor base
In the absence of reliable and comprehensive data,
the universe of CDO market participants and its
development can only be reconstituted on the basis
of surveys or empirical observations. According to
the annual Fitch Global Credit Derivative Survey,
the main market participants appear to be credit
institutions (net protection buyers and, hence, net
sellers of CDOs) and insurance companies (net
protection sellers and, hence, net buyers of CDOs).9
The latter include monoline insurers, which
specialise in guaranteeing the credit risk of obligors.
These insurers chiefly invest in unrated super senior
tranches of synthetic structures. However, the
involvement of insurance companies has tended to
decline since 2002, in particular following the
underperformance of the CDOs that they held in
their portfolios. More recently, other market
participants have stepped in, and the investor base
has broadened to other players in the alternative and
traditional asset management industry.
As the CDO market became increasingly complex,
hedge funds and banks’ proprietary trading
departments seem to have strengthened their
position. For example, they take advantage of the
liquidity and the flexibility of standard CDS index
tranches, to take long or short positions according
to their views on levels of default correlation in the
underlying portfolios (correlation trading). Likewise,
they increasingly enter into hedging transactions
with sellers of single-tranche CDOs (see Box 3).
Lastly, they invest in unfunded tranches, which
enables them to obtain a high degree of leverage with
a minimal stake. Overall, Standard and Poor’s
estimates that hedge funds account for one-third of
total activity on the CDO market.10
9 This observation is broadly corroborated by the “Results of the French market survey of credit risk transfer instrument”, see Commission
bancaire et alii (2004).
10 See Standard and Poor’s (2005).Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 53
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11 In particular in the form of instruments whose principal is guaranteed and whose return is linked to that of the CDO market.
12 For more details on the need for adequate risk management for credit risk transfert instruments, see Commission Bancaire et al. (2004).
Recently, managers of traditional funds such as
Undertakings for Collective Investment in
Transferable Securitites – UCITS – and pension funds
also appear to have started to invest in CDOs,
although this does not clearly emerge from available
surveys. Against the current backdrop of low interest
rates and the hunt for yield, some fund managers
may have been attracted by the combination of the
high ratings and much higher returns offered by
CDOs than those of corporate bonds with the same
rating. Moreover, investment banks are increasingly
offering products11 that enable them to sidestep the
ban imposed, in some countries, on mutual funds
on investing directly in synthetic CDOs, which are
considered derivatives. In all events, the
transposition of the UCITS III Directive into EU
Member State law should facilitate mutual fund
investment in credit derivatives and hence CDOs in
the future. For these players, CDOs may rightly be
considered a diversification tool for small portfolio
allocations. However, there is no saying that all of
these investors have the necessary competence to
correctly assess and measure all the risks involved
(see below).
3| IMPLICATIONS IN TERMS
OF FINANCIAL STABILITY
As credit risk transfer instruments, CDOs inherently
facilitate the dispersion of this risk within the
financial and banking sector and even beyond.
By increasing the degree of completeness of the
credit market, they are likely to have a positive
impact from a financial stability viewpoint.
However, these instruments are also subject to
specific risks, associated with the properties of the
underlying portfolios and structures, which must be
correctly understood and appropriately managed by
investors.12 But this is not always straightforward, as
evaluating a CDO requires complex quantitative
techniques that are all the more difficult to master
due to the fact that they have not yet been
implemented and tested over a sufficiently long
period. Irrespective of their level of expertise, players
on this segment may therefore be exposed to
relatively high potential losses.
Moreover, the marked narrowing of credit spreads
over the past two years seems to have been partly
linked to the direct or indirect impact of the growth
in CDO issuance, and in particular that of
single-tranche CDOs. More generally, the various
existing links between the CDO market, on the one
hand, and the corporate bond and credit derivatives
markets, on the other, raise questions as to the risks
of the propagation towards the latter of strains that
may arise on the CDO market due to its still limited
liquidity and transparency.
3|1 A credit risk transfer instrument
As long as CDOs are backed by well-designed and
robust structures, they can greatly facilitate the
dispersion of credit risk across a wide range of
investors. Their underlying portfolio can span many
names and economic sectors, with the share of each
name and each sector in the portfolio remaining
limited to a very low level (typically 2%). Indeed,
credit rating agencies have been particularly careful
to verify these conditions, which are determinant
in the process of rating CDO tranches.
Synthetic CDOs also enable investors to take
positions on names that are not represented in the
bond market, thus contributing to the completeness
of the credit market and at the same time facilitating
portfolio diversification. This is especially the case
in the euro area, where the corporate bond market
is concentrated in a small number of sectors
(automobile, telecommunications, etc.), which are
often overweighted in portfolios. Targeted
acquisitions of synthetic CDO tranches are therefore
a way of obtaining a more balanced and diversified
exposure, making it possible to appropriately weight
given names or sectors within a portfolio.
By allowing ad hoc exposure to a broader array of
issuers, CDOs may also be very useful for managing
bank portfolios that are not naturally diversified,
such as those of regional banks or specialised banks
whose risks are concentrated in certain sectors of
activity. Such institutions can therefore determine,
using internal models, the best names to ensure a
good diversification of their portfolio and invest
accordingly in CDOs referencing the names in54 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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question. Similarly, they can also issue balance sheet
CDOs in order to reduce risks on sectors or names
to which they feel overexposed.
3|2 Specific risks
CORRELATION RISK
It is much more difficult to assess the credit risk of a
portfolio containing a number of names than that of
companies taken individually. For the former, it is
necessary to take into account the fact that the
default of a given obligor may result, to different
degrees, in the default of other obligors in the
portfolio. This problem is particularly relevant in
the case of CDOs, for which the performance of the
individual tranches depends largely on the degree
of correlation of the defaults that may occur in the
underlying portfolio. The risk of CDO tranches must
therefore be analysed in two stages: first, the
probability of default (PD) of each obligor in the
underlying portfolio is determined (usually using
ratings), and, second, the potential loss distribution
of the portfolio is estimated (using models and ad
hoc assumptions on the degree of default
correlation).
Indeed, depending on the assumptions used, the
distribution of expected loss on the underlying
portfolio varies considerably (see chart). For a low
correlation, underlying names tend to display
independent trends, and the distribution is centred
Degree of correlation and distribution of losses of a reference portfolio of a CDO




































around a relatively low level of expected loss.
Conversely, a high degree of correlation results in
an asymmetric distribution with an increase in the
probability of extreme events (either no obligor
defaults, or all obligors default simultaneously).
Consequently, the tranching of a CDO, according to
an order that concentrates the risk in the most
subordinated tranches, generates a variety of impacts
of the default correlation on the performance of the
different tranches. Each tranche – senior, mezzanine,
equity – therefore has a different sensitivity to this
correlation.
On the basis of their models and correlation
assumptions, rating agencies determine the level of
protection required for the senior tranche of a CDO to
obtain a AAA rating. This is a key aspect of the
structure, given that any estimation error of the default
correlation may result in inappropriate structures that
are exposed to sharp and sudden downgrades.
However, the choice of appropriate default
correlation assumptions remains difficult. The
correlation between two companies that have never
defaulted is by definition very hard to estimate.
Consequently, CDO structures are exposed to the
risk that the correlation assumptions governing their
design may be incorrect. This risk is particularly high
in the case of CDOs of CDOs where a single name
may appear several times in the underlying portfolio,
thus potentially multiplying the effects of a
correlation estimation error.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 55
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The recent launch of standard tranches of CDS indices
(see Box 4) provides an initial partial response to this
difficulty associated with the measurement of the
correlation. It makes it possible to derive an indicator
of the level of default correlation from the price of
tranches.
RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH THE STRUCTURES
Aside from risks associated with the composition of
the reference portfolio, CDOs also entail risks more
specifically linked to the structure used for
transferring the income streams and/or the credit
risk of the underlying assets to investors.13
Legal risk is of fundamental importance because legal
and documentary issues are at the heart of both
ensuring the efficiency of risk transfer and of clearly
defining the role of the different parties involved in
a CDO structure. In the case of cash-flow CDOs, the
true sale of underlying assets to the SPV must be
guaranteed, so as to ensure that investors enjoy their
full rights in respect of these assets. Furthermore,
the SPV must be legally protected from all
consequences of a bankruptcy of the originator, in
particular regarding its rights in respect of the
underlying assets. Lastly, the role of third parties
involved in the structure must be very clearly defined
in order to prevent any operational or execution risks.
This may require replacement mechanisms should
one of the parties (in particular the servicer) no
longer be able to meet its obligations.
In the case of synthetic CDOs, it is of the utmost
importance to ensure the effectiveness of the legal
documentation governing the derivative contract
entered into by the SPV, in particular with respect to
the definition of credit events. As a rule, the broader
and less clear the definition of a credit event, the
more CDO investors, which are protection sellers,
are exposed to the risk of loss. However, progress
has recently been made in this area, thanks in
particular to ISDA efforts14, which resulted, in 2003,
in the creation of standard documentation for credit
derivatives. This documentation is currently widely
used for CDOs and includes a clear and relatively
narrow definition of credit events.15
Third party risk is also extremely important, as the
inability of a third party to meet its obligations could
jeopardise the viability of the transaction. This risk
is particularly relevant in the case of cash-flow CDOs,
where it takes the form of counterparty risk (vis-à-
vis the counterparties of interest rate or foreign
exchange swaps, or providers of external credit
enhancers). This risk is less common
for synthetic CDOs, where it only arises in
partly-funded transactions vis-à-vis the counterparty
of the super-senior swap. In order to manage this
risk, highly-rated counterparties are usually chosen,
and replacements are provided for whenever
possible in the event of a rating downgrade or failure
of a counterparty.
Lastly, if a cash-flow or synthetic CDO is actively
managed, its performance and robustness naturally
depend on the ability of the fund manager to
construct an appropriate underlying portfolio, and
if necessary to substitute some of the assets in the
portfolio at any point in the life of the CDO. In this
respect, it is important that these actions be duly
framed by the CDO’s legal documentation in order
to avoid possible conflicts of interest and to ensure
in all circumstances equal treatment for holders of
the different categories of tranches.
3|3 CDO valuation is delicate
and subject to model risk
Financial institutions investing in CDOs are often
required to mark them to market. This requirement
is expected to be bolstered by the application of IFRS.
However, the secondary CDO market is very narrow,
or even non-existent. Admittedly, a number of large
investment banks have recently been providing
quotations for certain CDOs. Other than these still
rare cases, market prices are only available for
tranches of CDS indices that cannot be used for
valuing CDOs with a non-standard underlying
portfolio. Investors must therefore calculate
theoretical prices for CDOs. However, the correlation
assumptions utilised in the valuation models are
uncertain (see above), and there exists a range of
models16 that are themselves complex and yet to
prove their worth. Investors, including those using
13 For further details, see Cousseran et al. (2005)
14 International Securities Dealers Association
15 This definition includes the failure, default and some forms of restructuring. See ISDA (2003).
16 For example, they may use a number of types of copula functions, the most commonly used being the Gaussian function.56 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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Box 4
Benefits of standard tranches of CDS indices for the European CDO market
In June 2004, the Dow Jones iTraxx(r) Europe index was created from the merger between two existing CDS indices.
At the same time, standard tranches of CDOs based on the iTraxx were issued. These tranches replicate the behaviour of
unfunded synthetic CDO tranches whose reference portfolio comprises names in the basket of the CDS index.1
Improved transparency, liquidity and risk management
These standard tranches have greatly contributed to the maturity of the CDO market and have resulted in:
• an improvement in the transparency of the market, as tranche prices are continuously quoted;
• a significant increase in market liquidity (transactions totalled almost USD 90 billion in 2004, according to Creditflux),
allowing protection to be bought and sold at a lower cost (bid/ask spreads of at most 5 basis points)
• an improvement in the management of market participants’ risk, as they now have access to daily valuations from which
they can obtain, using models, levels of implied correlation. In view of their liquidity, iTraxx tranches (or the iTraxx index
itself) can also be used by arrangers for the dynamic hedging of single-tranche CDOs.
• a broadening of the investor base to new market participants such as hedge funds, which use these instruments for their
sophisticated trading strategies (correlation trading).
A concrete example
An extract of an investment bank’s trading screen is reproduced below, showing the price of 5 tranches of the iTraxx, by
decreasing degree of subordination. From top to bottom: an equity tranche (0%-3%) two mezzanine tranches (3%-6%, 6%-
9%), a senior tranche (9%-12%), a first super senior tranche (12%-22%). Furthermore, a second non-quoted super senior
tranche (22%-100%) completes the structure.
Trading screen showing iTraxx tranches Diagram of a standard CDO based on the iTraxx
This screen is interpreted as follows:
• If a client of the investment bank buys protection on the mezzanine tranche 3%-6%, it pays the bank a premium of
143 basis points per year. If the proportion of losses on the iTraxx exceeds 3%, the client will be compensated. Compensation
is however limited (contrary to options) to the size of the tranche, i.e. 6%-3% = 3% of the notional amount of the transaction.
• The equity and mezzanine tranches are leveraged as their sensitivity to changes in credit spreads of the underlying index
(delta) is much higher than 1. For example, the quotations show that a 1 basis point rise in the iTraxx results in an 18.1 basis
points widening of the equity tranche spread (delta = 18.1).



























Rated  –  Variable yield
Mezzanine 3%-6%
BBB+ – 137 basis points 
Senior 9%-12%
 AAA – 25 basis points 
DJ iTraxx Europe 
(125 signatures) 
Official ratings do not exist for iTraxx tranches.
Those displayed above are implied ratings provided by Fitch. 
2nd super senior 22%-100% 
Unrated – unquoted
First super senior 12%-22% 
Unrated – 12 basis points
First super senior 12%-22% 
Unrated – 12 basis points
1 I.e. The 125 most liquid underlying names of the European CDS market. See www.djindexes.com.Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005 57
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sophisticated risk management tools, are therefore
particularly exposed to model risk, especially in
terms of estimating the default correlation of the
underlying portfolio. Moreover, in the current low
interest rate environment, some traditional investors
(UCITS, pension funds, insurance companies, etc.)
may have been investing in CDO tranches to capture
the yield pick-up generated at a given rating level
(see Box 5), without always being able to correctly
value or manage the risk entailed. If such behaviour,
favouring the search for yield over the safety of
investments, started to become widespread, it could,
given the losses that may be incurred, pose a risk to
financial stability. Nevertheless, at present, these
positions still appear sufficiently modest for such a
threat to be significant.
3|4 Complex hedging techniques
Sellers of CDOs may be exposed to market risk on
some structures that, in their design or management,
require regular transactions on credit markets. This
particularly applies to single-tranche CDOs in which
the originator of the structure sells the tranche
directly to an investor (see Box 3) and in doing so
becomes a protection buyer, thus exposing itself to
a risk associated with changes in credit spreads on
the names in the underlying portfolio of the tranche
it has sold.17
It must therefore use dynamic hedging techniques
(delta neutral) by entering into individual credit
default swaps and/or by purchasing corporate bonds
and/or CDS indices to hedge market risk. Amounts
for hedging are calculated using mathematical
models that are still not sufficiently tried and tested
and, moreover, are contingent on default correlation
assumptions regarding the reference portfolio.
Market risk also entails liquidity risk, as dynamic
hedging is only effective if the instruments used are
sufficiently liquid. However, among the instruments
presented above, only CDS indices have a
appropriate degree of liquidity due to their standard
nature. But due to this very fact, they do not allow
for perfect hedging. The arranger must therefore
refine the hedge by using individual credit default
swaps. Yet single-name CDSs is a truly liquid market
for only around 500 to 1000 names. Therefore, the
arranger often remains exposed to a liquidity risk
that may exacerbate its losses in the event of a
situation of stress on credit markets.18
The fact that the population of arrangers of
single-tranche CDOs is very concentrated increases
market risk and liquidity risk. Moreover, these risks
may spill over, given that many players are involved
in the risk management chain. These players
include, in addition to the arrangers themselves,
investors and the counterparties of hedging
transactions, which are often hedge funds.
3|5 Impact of CDOs on credit spreads
The links between the CDO, corporate bond and
credit default swap markets vary in terms of how
direct they are, but all indicate that CDO issuance is
a technical factor that now has a significant impact
on the level of credit spreads.
Firstly, structuring non-synthetic arbitrage CDOs
requires corporate bonds or ABS to be purchased,
thus giving rise to a demand that may be significant
in relation to the absorption capacity of the often
narrow primary and secondary markets (in
particular in Europe), and exerting downward
pressure on spreads.
Secondly and more significantly, given the volumes
involved, synthetic arbitrage CDOs create a close link
with the CDS market. In the case of single-tranche
CDOs, dynamic hedging is implemented by the
arranger of the structure on the CDS market (or using
CDS indices). Since the single tranches are usually
at the mezzanine level, they concentrate much of
the credit risk of the reference portfolio, which forces
the arranger to hedge its position by selling protection
for an exposure several times greater than the
tranches’ notional value (see Box 3). As a result of
this mechanism (relating to the leverage of the single
tranche), arrangers tend to lower the price of
protection, and hence the CDS premia. This
mechanism suggests that the boom in volumes of
single-tranche CDOs might have significantly
contributed to the marked narrowing of credit spreads
since mid-2003.
17 It is also at risk from the possiblity of sudden defaults on the underlying portfolio (jump-to-default risk), but this risk is far more difficult to
hedge.
18 See Fitch Ratings (2004)58 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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1 See Committee on the Global Financial System (2005)
Box 5
Are ratings a reliable measure of the risk of CDOs?
It is not uncommon for investors to assess the risk of an instrument in which they wish to invest chiefly on the basis of its
rating. Indeed, ratings reflect, in the form of a simple alphanumeric symbol, the creditworthiness of a security, making it
easy to rapidly compare the securities of different issuers across countries and sectors. As senior and mezzanine tranches
of CDOs benefit, by construction, from investment grade ratings (typically AAA or A), they may appear to be an attractive
and apparently low risk investment, especially since they offer much higher returns than those of corporate bonds with the
same ratings. However, the structured nature of CDOs limits the significance of their rating, as it only reflects certain
aspects of their credit risk.1 While ratings reflect a security’s average level of risk, they do not factor in the dispersion of risk
around its mean.
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Source: JP Morgan Source: Cantor and Hu (2003)
Synthetic CDO and corporate bond spreads
(euro area, in basis points over Euribor)
Average annual proportions of ratings downgraded,
upgraded and left unchanged by category of security
Yet, the sequential allocation of losses to CDO tranches results in expected loss being concentrated in subordinated
tranches, which consequently have a very different risk profile, for the same rating, from that of corporate bonds. For the
latter, the probability of extreme events, such as the loss of an investor’s entire stake, is very low. Conversely, for the
mezzanine tranche of a CDO, a fairly low proportion of losses on the underlying portfolio (around 6%-10%) would suffice
for an investor to lose its stake. This also applies, to a lesser extent, to AAA-rated senior tranches of synthetic CDOs that,
despite their name, are often subordinated to the super-senior tranche. Investors in CDOs that focus on excess returns,
only using ratings to assess the risk, might thus be exposing themselves to greater-than-expected losses.
Furthermore, CDO ratings, like corporate bond ratings, have proven much more volatile than those of traditional securitisation
products (see table). They are also liable to be downgraded more frequently and more severely than traditional securitisation
products or corporate bonds. While records available in this area are still too incomplete to draw definitive conclusions, this
pattern nevertheless shows the difficulty of the task of rating agencies, given the wide range of factors that influence CDO
ratings.
In order to interpret the pattern of CDO rating changes it is necessary to take account of both structural and cyclical factors.
The main structural factor is the concentration of the CDS market, which comprises 500 to 1000 liquid names, forcing
arrangers of synthetic CDOs to constantly draw on the same pool. Some names are found in dozens of CDOs and,
consequently, if they default (or their rating is downgraded) the impact would be greatly amplified. On the cyclical side,
CDOs designed in the 1990s and the early 2000s often contained design flaws, in particular in terms of diversification,
which led rating agencies to step up their requirements. The combination of these two types of factors explains the 2002
episode, the “annus horribilis” for CDOs, during which the rating of a quarter of European structures was downgraded;
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To date, this mechanism does not seem to have
resulted in major distortions in the pricing of the
risk of the names concerned. Admittedly, though,
credit market fundamentals have been continuously
improving. Nevertheless, it is possible that, in the
long term, the success of single-tranche CDOs may
cause spreads to narrow further, to the extent that
investors may no longer be sufficiently rewarded for
the risk they take. At the same time, we cannot rule
out, in the event of a heightening of credit risk or a
general reassessment of this risk by the market, a
reversal in this leverage-related mechanism, which
would then amplify the correction of the market and
contribute to a substantial widening of credit spreads.
In view of the ever closer links between the CDO
market and the other segments of the credit market,
strains affecting one segment may spill over to other
segments with an amplifying effect, thus increasing
the risks of contagion in the financial system. The
still relatively limited liquidity and transparency of
the CDO and CDS markets may exacerbate this
phenomenon, and could lead to sharp price swings
and then prevent these markets from being able to
reallocate risk appropriately.60 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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GLOSSARY
ABS (Asset backed security): A security that represents an interest in non-mortgage financial assets (consumer
loans, credit card debt, etc.).
Arranger: In a CDO structure, the arranger is the entity (an investment bank or an asset management firm)
responsible for placing tranches with investors in return for a fee. In the case of “arbitrage” CDOs, it may also
be the originator of the transaction, or even the entity which actively manages the underlying portfolio.
CBO (Collateralised Bond Obligation): Type of CDO where the underlying portfolio comprises bonds.
CDO (Collateralised Debt Obligation): A security backed by a pool of bank loans and/or negotiable financial
instruments (bonds, other debt securities, etc.), and/or credit derivatives.
CDO2 (CDO of CDO): Type of CDO where the underlying portfolio is itself made up of CDO tranches.
CLO (Collateralised Loan Obligation): Type of CDO where the underlying portfolio comprises bank loans.
CSO (Collateralised Synthetic Obligation): Type of CDO where the underlying portfolio comprises credit
derivatives.
CDS (Credit Default Swap): A financial contract between two parties in which a protection buyer pays a
premium to a protection seller in exchange for protection against the occurrence of a credit event on the
reference entity.
Seller: In a securitisation structure, the seller designates the entity (usually a bank) selling its assets to the
special purpose vehicle.
CMBS (Commercial Mortgage-Backed Security): A debt obligation that represents claims to the cash flows
from pools of mortgage loans on commercial property.
Reserve account: In a securitisation structure, a reserve account is used to provide credit enhancement.
Excess cash flows from the transaction are progressively deposited in this account.
Equity (tranche): In a securitisation structure, this tranche absorbs the first losses arising from defaults on
the underlying portfolio.
Copula Fonctions: These functions have recently been introduced in applied finance to obtain a broader and
more realistic range of joint distributions describing the dependence structure between a number of variables.
Originator: The entity setting up a securitisation vehicle. Depending on the type of securitisation, the originator
may be the arranger or the seller.
Mezzanine (tranche): In a securitisation structure, this tranche absorbs the losses arising from a default on
the underlying portfolio if they exceed the value of the equity tranche.
Monoline: An insurer that provides financial guaranty insurance for bond issuance or securitisation transactions.
Servicer: In a securitisation structure, the servicer is the entity charged with collecting cash flows on the
underlying portfolio on behalf of the vehicle, which are subsequently paid to the tranche holders. This function
is generally performed by the seller.62 Banque de France • Financial Stability Review • No. 6 • June 2005
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RMBS (Residential Mortgage-Backed Security): A debt obligation that represents claims to the cash flows from
pools of mortgage loans on residential property.
Senior (tranche): In a securitisation structure, this tranche absorbs the losses arising from a default on the
underlying portfolio if they exceed the amounts of the equity and mezzanine tranches.
SPV (Special Purpose Vehicle): In a securitisation structure, an SPV is a standalone ad-hoc vehicle with a finite
life, which holds the underlying asset portfolio and issues securities representing this portfolio.
Super-senior (tranche): In a partially-funded synthetic CDO, this unfunded tranche benefits from the
subordination of the senior tranche. Therefore it represents the piece of the deal that offers the best protection
against losses.